Late in 1780, Major General Nathanael Greene assumed command of America’s Southern Army. One of Greene’s first actions was to place the best men of the Southern Army under the command of General Daniel Morgan. General Greene proudly wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette that he had given the name of the "Flying Army" to Morgan’s detachment. On Dec. 16, 1780, Greene ordered Morgan to march the Flying Army west and deep into the backcountry, beyond the Catawba River. Greene wrote to Morgan in his orders: "The detachment is to give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people, and to annoy the enemy in that quarter."

At the outbreak of the Revolution, the sum of Nathanael Greene's military knowledge had been confined to what he could glean from books. In dividing his already small force in the face of a superior army, Greene threw the books out the window. Napoleon Bonaparte, who later coined the maxim "divide to live, unite to conquer" was then just 11 years old. Conventional theory still held that a general did not risk his army by splitting it. In his two-volume history of the Revolution, 20th century historian Christopher Ward called Greene's deliberate splitting of his army "the most audacious and ingenious piece of military strategy of the war."

Greene's decision was not the lucky mistake of a novice; he did it deliberately. Greene wrote: "It makes the most of my inferior force, for it compels my adversary to divide his, and holds him in doubt as to his own line of conduct. He can not leave Morgan behind him to come at me, or his posts of Ninety-Six (an oddly named but important frontier outpost) and Augusta would be exposed. And he cannot chase Morgan far, or prosecute his views upon Virginia, while I am here with the whole country open before me."

Cornwallis detached Colonel Banastre Tarleton with all of the British light troops and cavalry to chase Morgan’s "Flying Army". By January 16, 1781, Morgan and the "Flying Army" had reached an area on the South Carolina and North Carolina border known as "Cowpens". (Local farmers used the area to graze their cattle.) Tarleton and his troops were in "hot" pursuit.

Early on the morning of January 17, 1781, General Daniel Morgan arranged the approximately 1800 soldiers of his "Flying Army" according to an imaginative battle plan. This battle plan called for three separate lines. The first was a skirmish line of American militia armed with rifles and numbering approximately 200 men. The second was the main line of American militia and composed of approximately 650 men. The third line was composed of approximately 600 Continentals, Morgan’s best troops. Morgan stationed both his Continental Dragoons and mounted militia (approximately 350 men) behind the left flank of the Continentals.

All of these soldiers had a good night's sleep and some food. Of real interest was the location of the Continental infantry. These soldiers were down hill from the main militia line and were hidden from the view of the British as they moved to attack the American position.

Colonel Banastre Tarleton marched his men all night to reach Cowpens, with only one brief rest stop. Early in the morning of the 17th, Tarleton finally found the "Flying Army" and arranged his troops to attack. His main line consisted of about 600 infantry, with cavalry flankers of about 50 per side. He kept in reserve the 71st Highland infantry regiment (approximately 250 men) and the British Legion Dragoons (approximately 225 men). Both of his artillery pieces (3 lb. cannon, called "Grasshoppers" because of their small size and carriage) were placed on his main battle line.

Perhaps you can understand the trap that Morgan had set for Tarleton. The Americans had three separate battle lines, each one tougher than the one before it. As the British hit each line in succession, more of their "attack power" would be lost. By the time they got to Morgan's strongest line (i.e., the Continentals), the British infantry would be exhausted.

The battle proceeded exactly as General Morgan had planned. As the British got in range of the American militia skirmishers, these riflemen started picking off the British officers and noncoms (British casualties: approximately 20 killed and 30 wounded). After firing 3 or 4 shots, the American militia skirmishers fell back to the main militia line.

Morgan had told the men stationed on the main militia line that they only had to fire 2 shots and then they could fall back to regroup behind the Continentals. He knew that his militia was no match for the regular British infantry in a standup type of fight. This was proven time after time during the American Revolutionary War. However, the militia rifle and musket fire was much more accurate than the British musket fire. If the American militia knew they only had to fire twice and then retreat to a place of safety, they would not panic. The British line next hit the American main militia line. The militia fired 2 shots and then retreated (British casualties: approximately 30 killed and 70 wounded).

This was just what Tarleton was waiting for! He could not see the third line of Continentals; and he believed that Morgan's army was in complete retreat. Tarleton ordered all of his troops (including his reserves) into an all-out charge. Morgan's trap was set. As the British battle line went over the hill in pursuit of the American militia; it found itself up against the strongest line of all, the American Continentals. The American militia regrouped behind the Continentals. The British cavalry tried to get around the American flanks, only to be destroyed by the combined American cavalry. The British infantry (weakened by a night march, no food, and the attacks against two American battle lines) struck the Continentals and fell apart (British casualties: 60 killed and 100 wounded, approximately).

What followed was an American "Turkey Shoot". Tarleton's army of 1200 men lost about 120 killed, 220 wounded, and 510 captured (including both artillery pieces). This constituted a 70% loss. American losses were about 25 killed and 110 wounded, a 7.5% loss. Tarleton, with what was left of his army, fell back to the main British army under General Cornwallis.

Without the combined arms task force of Colonel Tarleton, the British army of Cornwallis did not have an adequate means of obtaining intelligence of American movements. Most of their light troops and cavalry had been destroyed at Cowpens. Cornwallis moved "blind" through North Carolina into Virginia and was trapped at Yorktown. (Note: General Cornwallis broke his own sword in a fit of anger after hearing the results of the Battle of Cowpens.)

I highly recommend the reading of A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens, by Lawrence E. Babits. This battle, though not well known, was one of the most important battles of the American Revolution.